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A Plurilateral Investment Treaty:




Despite some inherent risks, foreign direct investment (FDI)
is for some the preferred method of investment. The rising number
of bilateral investment reaties governing FDI is merely reflective
of this investment vehicle's popularity. Since the early-nineteenth
century, developed countries have sought to gain protection for
investors engaging in these investment opportunities. One such
protection, the Hull Doctrine, requires national governments to
fully compensate investors in cases of unlawful expropriation.
Until World War II, when developing countries began applying
their own domestic eminent domain law to foreign investors, the
Hull Doctrine was considered binding, customary international
law. This Note analyzes the effects of recent trade treaties, the
Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership, and assesses whether these treaties'
inclusion of the Hull standard re-establishes the doctrine as a
twenty-first century customary international norm.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Foreign shareholders had invested billions of dollars in one of
Russia's largest oil companies, Yukos Oil Company, when suddenly the
Russian government rendered that investment practically obsolete.'
The Russian government "leveled massive [tax] claims against
Yukos."2 Shortly thereafter, Yukos' Chief Executive Officer, Mikhail
Khodorkovsky, was arrested under suspicious circumstances and
imprisoned for over ten years.3 Immediately following Khodorkovsky's
arrest, Yukos conveniently sold most of its assets to a Russian
government-owned oil producer and declared bankruptcy.4 Yukos
shareholders challenged Russia's actions as an unlawful
expropriation.5 Ultimately, the Permanent Court of Arbitration
1. Danica Kirka, Russia ordered to pay $50 billion over Yukos, ASSOC. PRESS
(June 28, 2014), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/russia-ordered-pay-50b-over-yukos




5. See id.; Yukos Oil Company and Russian Expropriation, EXPROPRIATION IN
RUSSIA, http://expropriationnewsrussia.com/en/prominent-russian-expropriation-
cases/yukos-oil-company/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2016) [https://perma.cc/45UU-S6YM]
(archived Dec. 19, 2016).
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awarded Yukos shareholders over $50 billion in what remains "one of
the largest commercial arbitration awards in history."6
Although the Yukos arbitration is certainly an exceptional case,7
it demonstrates the relevance of investor protection, investment risk,
and expropriation laws in the twenty-first century. Investors engaging
in foreign direct investment (FDI), a type of investment in which
investors purchase ownership interests in a foreign business, are
foremost concerned about investment risks.8 Investment risks are
heightened in FDI because national governments may choose to
expropriate a business9 by nationalizing or otherwise "taking [the]
privately owned property."1 0 Before World War II, customary
international law dictated that governments pay investors "prompt,
adequate, and effective compensation" upon expropriation. This
compensation standard was most commonly referred to as the Hull
Doctrine.12 This doctrine has since fallen out of favor, resulting in the
absence of a uniform international norm to govern compensation owed
to investors as a result of an unlawful expropriation.13
This Note will assess the impact of the Trans-Pacific Trade
Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP), two massive interregional trade agreements that
have yet to be ratified, on the Hull Doctrine's status as a customary
international norm. In particular, this Note analyzes whether these
large interregional trade treaties have catapulted the Hull Doctrine
once again to the status of a customary international law norm.
6. Kirka, supra note 1.
7. See H. COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 88TH CONG., REPORT ON EXPROPRIATION
OF AMERICAN-OWNED PROPERTY BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY (Comm. Print 1963), 2 I.L.M. 1066 (1963) [hereinafter REPORT ON
EXPROPRIATION OF AMERICAN-OWNED PROPERTY] (stating that a large number of
expropriations have been committed by communist countries).
8. See Justin Kuepper, What is Foreign Direct Investment?, THE BALANCE (June
8, 2016), http://internationalinvest.about.com/odlinvestinginmultinationalsla/What-Is-
Foreign-Direct-Investment.htm [https://perma.cclLV5E-ZF8B] (archived Dec. 19, 2016)
("On a micro level, the investments [in FDI] have several risks that should be carefully
considered.").
9. See id. ("Investors should be aware of the risk of nationalization, political
conflicts and other potential problems that may arise.").
10. Expropriation, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/
expropriation.asp (last visited Jan. 16, 2017) [https://perma.ccV4WF-8722] (archived
Dec. 19, 2016) (defining expropriation as "the act of a government in taking privately
owned property, ostensibly to be used for purposes designed to benefit the overall public.
In the United States, what is referred to as 'eminent domain' provides the legal
foundation for expropriation").
11. See Patrick M. Norton, A Law of the Future or a Law of the Past? Modern
Tribunals and the International Law of Expropriation, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 474, 476-77 (1991).
12. See id. ("Under the 'Hull formula,' state expropriation of foreign-owned
property required the payment of 'prompt, adequate, and effective' compensation."').
13. See infra Section III.C.
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Part II provides a historical background on the law of
expropriation and compensation. Part II details how the Hull Doctrine
fell out of grace with the international community and explores the
competing doctrine, the Calvo Doctrine, which developing countries
supported following the world wars. Part III examines the
expropriation provisions in the TPP and the TTIP, as well as other
sources, to determine whether the Hull Doctrine has gained the
requisite support to be considered customary international law in the
twenty-first century. Although this Note recognizes a trend toward
adopting the Hull Doctrine, it concludes that the Hull Doctrine cannot
yet be considered customary international law. This Note then
recommends, in Part IV, that states conclude a plurilateral agreement
on investment law within the auspices of the WTO to re-establish the
Hull Doctrine as a customary norm. Establishing a plurilateral
investment agreement would not only be indicative of widely-held
support for the Hull Doctrine, but encouraging FDI in a plurilateral
investment agreement may also incentivize capital investments
abroad and improve economic conditions in developing countries.
II. BACKGROUND
A. When Developed Western Nations Governed Customary
International Law
Twenty-first century developing countries are often adverse to the
Western idea, embedded in international investment law treaties, that
states fully compensate foreign investors for property a state chooses
to expropriate.14 The historical development of international
investment law demonstrates why developing countries are adverse to
this international investment norm of expropriation, commonly
referred to as "full compensation" or the Hull Doctrine.1
5
International investment laws, particularly those aiming to
protect foreign-owned property, first developed in early seventeenth-
century Europe when the rise in trade and investment among
14. See, e.g., Sundaresh Menon, Attorney General of Singapore, Opening Speech
at the ICCA 2012 Congress: International Arbitration: The Coming of a New Age for Asia
(and Elsewhere) (June 11, 2012), http://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/0/13398435632
250/ags-opening-speechjiccascongress_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Y8A-P326] (archived
Dec. 19, 2016) ("[International investment arbitration] has the potential to constrain the
exercise of domestic public authority in a manner and to a degree perhaps not seen since
the colonial era . . . . The pro-investor attitude has even been cited as the reason
arbitrators from developing world often rule in favour of investors from traditionally
capital-exporting countries, this being the "price" that has to be paid to gain credibility
and access to the privileged club of elite international arbitrators.").
15. See generally Norton, supra note 11 (naming the International Law of
Expropriation as stated in the Hull Doctrine and the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States § 712 "full compensation").
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European nation-states called for a more uniform body of trade law.16
In the century that followed, colonialism led to the geographic
expansion of Europe's investment laws that were rooted in protecting
property rights,'7 which naturally favored European interests.18 As the
number of foreign investments surged during the nineteenth century,'9
a new field within international investment law, commonly referred to
as "diplomatic protection of aliens," emerged.20 This field "was
premised on the theory that an injury done to a foreigner was an injury
done to their state, and, as such, enabled the home state to take action
on their nationals' behalf."1
The adoption of the "diplomatic protection of aliens" arose, at least
in part, because Western states were eager to establish binding
customary international law that protected their citizens' investments
and ensured that developing nations would fulfill international
expectations by adhering to foreign investment commitments.22 Hence,
a state that interfered with a foreign investor's expectations by
nationalizing foreign-owned property violated international
investment law unless "the following conditions were met: a) the
expropriation was carried out for a public purpose; b) it was not
arbitrary or discriminatory; and c) prompt, adequate, and effective
compensation was paid."23
A more familiar recitation of this international norm is articulated
in a dispute that arose between Mexico and the United States in
1938.24 The Mexican government had expropriated oil fields, located in
Mexico, that had been owned by Mexican as well as American and
British citizens.25 Initially, the Mexican government refused to
16. KATE MILES, THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: EMPIRE,
ENVIRONMENT AND THE SAFEGUARDING OF CAPITAL 2 (2013).
17. See CHARLES LIPSON, STANDING GUARD: PROTECTING FOREIGN CAPITAL IN
THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES 3-4 (1985).
18. See MILES, supra note 16, at 2 ("[F]oreign investment and trade protection
rules became part of an array of tools used to further the political and commercial
aspirations of European states . . . .").
19. See LIPSON, supra note 17, at 4.
20. MILES, supra note 16, at 47.
21. Id.
22. See JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 92-94 (2009)
(explaining that nineteenth-century investment laws recognized that states had the
right to eminent domain, but those states could violate international law by failing to
compensate foreign investors for their loss).
23. MILES, supra note 16, at 48.
24. See Norton, supra note 11, at n.6 ("In a 1938 dispute over Mexico's
nationalization of foreign-owned oil fields, U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull averred
that international law required Mexico to pay 'prompt, adequate, and effective'
compensation. This shorthand summary of the standard claimed by the United States is
generally called the 'Hull formula."').
25. Milestone- 1937-1945, Mexican Expropriation of Foreign Oil, 1938, U.S.
DEPT. OF STATE OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-
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reimburse foreign investors with full compensation.26 The United
States Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, "declared that the property of
aliens was protected by an international standard under which
expropriation was subject to limitations, which required that there be
'prompt, adequate and effective compensation."27 In practice,
"[c]ompensation is considered to be prompt if paid without delay;
adequate, if it has a reasonable relationship with the market value of
the investment concerned; and effective, if paid in convertible or freely
useable currency."28 Consistent with customary international law, the
governments of Mexico, Britain, and the United States reached an
agreement that resulted in Mexico compensating foreign investors
approximately $159 million.29 Secretary Hull's interpretation of this
compensation standard is now commonly referred to as the Hull
Doctrine.30
The Mexican government's initial rejection of the Hull Doctrine
did not necessarily negate its status as a binding customary
international norm during the early-twentieth century. During this
time, there were approximately sixty cases presented in front of the
Permanent Court of International Justice, "many dealing with claims
arising out of takings of alien property. Although their reasoning is
sometimes obscure, none held that the appropriate measure of
compensation was less than the full value of the property taken, and
many specifically affirmed the need for full compensation."3 1 In the
Chorzow Factory case, the Permanent Court of International Justice
held that Poland's unlawful expropriation of a foreign-owned company
violated international law and required Poland to compensate
investors with "the just price of what was expropriated, measured as
the value of the undertaking at the moment of dispossession, plus
interest to the day of payment."32 Not only did these international
tribunals side with Western conceptions of full compensation, but the
United States also affirmed the legitimacy of the Hull Doctrine by
1945/mexican-oil (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) [https://perma.cc/SVA5-WVZH] (archived
Dec. 19, 2016) [hereinafter Milestone: 1937-1945].
26. See Noel Maurer, The Empire Struck Back: Sanctions and Compensation in
the Mexican Oil Expropriation of 1938, 71 J. ECON. HIST. 590, 591 (2011).
27. See SALACUSE, supra note 22, at 68.
28. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD),
EXPROPRIATION: UNCTAD SERIES ON ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
AGREEMENTS II 40 (2012), http://unctad.org/en/Does/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf (last
visited Dec. 19, 2016) [https://perma.cc/ZRX5-JH65] (archived Dec. 19, 2016) [hereinafter
Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements Il].
29. Milestone: 1937-1945, supra note 25, at 608.
30. Norton, supra note 11, at 474 n.6.
31. Id. at 476-77.
32. Id. at 476 (internal citations omitted).
[VOL. 50:499504
A PLURILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY
incorporating the doctrine into the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign
Relations Law.3 3
B. The Aftermath of World War II: The Rise of State Sovereignty and a
Rejection of the Norms of Colonizing States
The end of colonialism after World War II led to a new outlook on
international investment law and the eventual rejection of the Hull
doctrine.34 Developing states "desire[d] to assume control of the
exploitation of their natural resources which had formerly been at the
disposition of the colonial powers."35 In rejecting the Hull doctrine,
developing states rejected a norm that had arguably favored the
interests of investors from Western states without concern for a
developing nation's ability to compensate.3 6 Moreover, developing
nations clung to more defined notions of sovereignty as they argued
that domestic law was the more appropriate venue to compensate
foreign investors.3 7 No doubt, the rise of communism, which repudiated
the concept of private property rights, contributed to the growing
aversion toward a Western doctrine that steadfastly protected the
interests of property holders.3 8
Many developing states in Latin America adopted the Calvo
Doctrine, a competing approach to the Hull Doctrine.3 9 The Calvo
Doctrine provided that, upon expropriation, states should apply their
own domestic laws when calculating the compensation owed to foreign
investors. 40 For instance, if a state's domestic laws only required it to
33. See id. (asserting that the Hull doctrine "was recently reformulated in the
Restatement (Third)"); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 712 ("A state is responsible under international law for injury
resulting from: (1) a taking by the state of the property of nation of another state that
(a) is not for a public purpose; or (b) is discriminatory; or (c) is not accompanied by
provision for just compensation.").
34. See, e.g., Francis J. Nicholson, The Protection of Foreign Property Under
Customary International Law, 61 B.C. L. REV. 391, 391-92 (1965).
35. Id. at 391.
36. MILES, supra note 16, at 49.
37. Nicholson, supra note 34, at 391-92.
38. REPORT ON EXPROPRIATION OF AMERICAN-OWNED PROPERTY, supra note 7,
at 1067 ("Since the end of the Second World War, expropriations have increased. The
most widespread expropriations have occurred in the countries which adopted
communism.").
39. Justine Daly, Has Mexico Crossed the Border on State Responsibility for
Economic Injury to Aliens? Foreign Investment and the Calvo Clause in Mexico After the
NAFTA, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1147, 1150 (1994).
40. Id. ("The Calvo Doctrine, named after the famed Argentine jurist, Carlos
Calvo, encompasses two basic concepts: (1) the requirement of absolute equality of the
treatment of aliens with the treatment of nationals, meaning that aliens have resort to
local remedies only, and (2) the policy of nonintervention of the alien's state of
nationality.").
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pay one-half the purchase value of an ownership interest, the Calvo
Doctrine suggested that state pay only half of the value rather than
"adequate, effective, and prompt" compensation that the Hull Doctrine
requires.4 1 Thus, foreign investors were put on equal footing with
domestic investors.42 The Calvo Doctrine emphasized state autonomy
distinct from Western control and served as a response to concerns that
Western states had impeded the sovereignty of developing states.43
The rejection of the Hull Doctrine did not have an immediate effect
among the consensus of states.44 During the 1970s, arbitral awards
involving the international law of expropriation in Middle Eastern
countries cited to "general principles of law," upholding petroleum
concessions previously negotiated.45 Based on precedent, these arbitral
awards reaffirmed the Hull Doctrine's application in expropriation
disputes, demonstrating a continued reliance on the Western states'
compensation approach throughout the 1960s.4 6
The death-knell for the Hull Doctrine's status as a binding norm
of customary international law sounded in 1973 when the United
Nations General Assembly issued a resolution affirming:
the application of the principle of nationalization carried out by States, as an
expression of their sovereignty in order to safeguard their natural resources,
implies that each State is entitled to determine the amount of possible
compensation and the mode of payment, and that any disputes which might arise
should be settled in accordance with the national legislation of each State
carrying out such measures.47
This resolution, supported by eighty-six governments, was not the
only General Assembly resolution to support state sovereignty to the
detriment of the Hull Doctrine.48
In the wake of this rejection, attempts to conclude a
comprehensive multilateral investment treaty regime also failed.49
International investment issues had almost exclusively been resolved
between two states in bilateral investment treaties (BITs).50 From
41. Id. at 1169.
42. Id. at 1150.
43. Id. at 1161.
44. See Norton, supra note 11, at 477 (listing the arbitral awards during the
decolonization era that adhered to the Hull Doctrine).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 477-78.
47. G.A. Res. 3171 (XXVIII), at 52 (Dec. 17, 1973).
48. See Norton, supra note 11, at 474, 474 n.3 (citing G.A. Res. 3201, Declaration
on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1974)
and G.A- Res. 3281, Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974) among others).
49. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Dev., Bilateral Investment
Treaties 1995-2006, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2006/5 (2007) [hereinafter UNCTAD Report].
50. See id. at xi.
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1995 until 2006, states concluded BITs at a rapid rate, partially as a
result of Latin American states' efforts to bring in more foreign direct
investment.51 Even though most of these BITs included "some formula
of full or nearly full compensation," developing nations adhered to what
they claimed to be the "default rule"--compensation for expropriation
relying on the home state's domestic law-unless the "default rule
[was] trumped by some domestic law or treaty."52
C. The TPP's and TTIP's Revolutionary Impact on International
Investment Law
The global landscape in investment law has the potential to
dramatically change with the conclusion of the TPP on October 5,
201553 and the pending conclusion of the TTIP. These two trade
agreements represent a departure from BITs and suggest a rise in the
popularity of complex and massive regional trade agreements. To best
elucidate the impact of the TPP and the TTIP, if both agreements were
ratified by all signatories, the two agreements combined would "govern
the investment relations of 65% of the world economy."54
The TPP was negotiated between twelve nations "representing
two-fifths of the global economy"55 and has been negotiated as a "living
agreement that other trading partners could join." 56 On October 5,
2015, twelve nations signed the TPP. The twelve signatories included:
the United States, "Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile,
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and
Vietnam."57 The United States and the European Union have yet to'
finalize an agreement.58 While the TPP is the largest regional treaty
51. Steven R. Ratner, Regulatory Takings in Institutional Context: Beyond the
Fear of Fragmented International Law, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 475, 477 (2008); see UNCTAD
Report, supra note 49, at xi.
52. Ratner, supra note 51, at 477.
53. Jackie Calmes, Trans-Pacific Partnership Is Reached, but Faces Scrutiny in
Congress, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/06/business/
trans-pacific-partnership-trade-deal-is-reached.html?_r=O [https://perma.cc/G8JT-YLTS]
(archived Dec. 29, 2016).
54. Charles N. Brower & Sadie Blanchard. What's in a Meme? The Truth about
Investor-State Arbitration: Why It Need Not, and Must Not, Be Repossessed by States, 52
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 689, 696 (2014).
55. Calmes, supra note 53.
56. SHAYERAH ILIAS AKHTAR & VIVIAN JONES, CONG. RES. SERV., PROPOSED
TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP: IN BRIEF 3 (2015).
57. Overview of the Trans Pacific Partnership, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/tpp/overview-of-the-TPP (last visited Dec. 29, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/B23T-9SHGI (archived Dec. 29, 2016) [hereinafter Overview of TPP].
58. Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/
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on investment ever concluded, the TTIP, if ratified, will also have a
significant impact on investment since "[t]he two sides account for
nearly half of world gross domestic product (GDP), about 30% of global
exports, and have investments of more than $3.7 trillion in each other's
economies."5 9 Furthermore, both the United States and the European
Union "have expressed an interest in using the TTIP to present
common approaches for the development of globally-relevant rules and
standards in future multilateral trade negotiations,"60 suggesting that
the European Union and the United States are working to develop
international investment norms through their negotiations of the
TTIP.
The future of these two regional multilateral agreements, though,
is now uncertain. On January 23, 2017, President Trump formally
withdrew the United States as a signatory of the TPP.6 Following U.S.
withdrawal from the TPP, Australia has continued to communicate
with other signatories in an effort to push forward on the agreement.62
Other TPP signatories, including Japan, are instead "turning their
focus to the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, an
alternative 16-nation deal that includes China and India."63
Alternatively, although President Trump's intentions toward
finalizing negotiations on the TTIP are unclear, President Trump has
stated a policy in favor of renegotiating BITs rather than conducting
trade negotiations at a regional multinational level.64 Therefore, it is
doubtful that the European Union and the United States will become
signatories to the TTIP under the Trump Administration.
Even though the future implementation of the TPP and the TTIP
is uncertain, it is important to understand the agreements' underlying
policy goals relating to investment as states decide whether to adopt
the TPP and the TTIP or begin negotiations on alternative investment
treaties. Because the TPP and the TTIP are intended to govern such a
large sector of global investment and both have included the Hull
transatlantic-trade-and-investment-partnership-t-tip/t-tip (last visited Dec. 29, 2016)
[https://perma.ccl8JYL-RLCL] (archived Dec. 29, 2016).
59. AKHTAR & JONES, supra note 56.
60. Id.
61. Presidential Memorandum Regarding Withdrawal of the United States from
the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 23,
2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/23/presidential-memorandu
m-regarding-withdrawal-united-states-trans-pacific [https://perma.cc/6Z7F-XW9K]
(archived Mar. 5, 2017) [hereinafter Presidential Memorandum Regarding Withdrawal
from the TPP].
62. Isabel Reynolds & Michael Heath, Australia Pushes for TPP Without U.S.
After Trump Exits Deal, BLOOMBERG POLITICS (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.
com/politics/articles/2017-01-24/australia-leads-push-for-tpp-without-u-s-after-trump-
exits-deal [https:/perma.ccl29SQ-34DJ] (archived Mar. 5, 2017).
63. Id.
64. Presidential Memorandum Regarding Withdrawal from the TPP, supra note 61.
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Doctrine in their finalized or negotiated texts,6 5 it is still necessary to
assess whether these two agreements would, if concluded and ratified,
re-establish the Hull Doctrine as a binding customary international
norm.
III. ANALYSIS
A. The TPP's and TTIP's Foreign Investment Expropriation Provisions
Chapter Nine of the TPP details member parties' obligations
relating to investment law.66 TPP Article 9.8 defines when an
expropriation can lawfully occur:
No Party shall expropriate or nationalise a covered investment either directly or
indirectly through measures equivalent to expropriation or nationalisation
(expropriation), except: (a) for a public purpose; (2) in a non-discriminatory
manner; (c) on payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation in
accordance with paragraphs 2, 3, and 4; and (d) in accordance with due process
of law.67
The TPP's expropriation provision only applies to a "covered
investment," which includes investments made by a national of a
member party "in existence as of the date of entry into force of this
Agreement for those Parties or established, acquired, or expanded
thereafter."68
Article 9.8 of the TPP codifies compensation requirements for
member parties when an expropriation of a covered investment occurs:
Compensation shall: (a) be paid without delay; (b) be equivalent to the fair
market value of the expropriated investment immediately before the
expropriation took place (the date of expropriation); (c) not reflect any change in
value occurring because the intended expropriation had become known earlier;
and (d) be fully realisable and freely transferable.69
While the TPP negotiations have formally been concluded and the
text finalized (pending ratification and amendments by the
signatories), the United States and the European Union have not
concluded negotiations on the TTIP, and the TTIP remains in the
65. See infra Section III.A.
66. TRANS PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP CHAPTER 9 - INVESTMENT, at 9-1,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Investment.pdf (last visited Dec. 29,
2016) [https://perma.cc/T4VN-27EQ] (archived Dec. 29, 2016) [hereinafter Trans Pacific
Partnership Chapter 9].
67. Id. at 9-9.
68. Id. at 9-1.
69. Id. at 9-9.
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drafting stages.70 Nevertheless, the TTIP's definitions for lawful
expropriation and compensation in the European Union's internal
TTIP draft present identical obligations for nations seeking to
expropriate foreign investment under the TPP.71
For instance, Article 5.1 of TTIP's Chapter II draft on investment
bans expropriation by a member party unless four conditions are
present.72 The proposed TTIP text states:
Neither Party shall nationalize or expropriate a covered investment either
directly or indirectly through measures having an effect equivalent to
nationalisation or expropriation (hereinafter referred to as 'expropriation')
except: (a) for a public purpose; (b) under due process of law; (c) in a non-
discriminatory manner; and (d) against payment of prompt, adequate and
effective compensation.73
Both the TPP and the TTIP require member states to provide
"payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation" to foreign
investors whose covered investments have been either expropriated or
nationalized by a member party.74 Not only does this language appear
in both the TPP text and the TTIP draft text, but this language is also
an exact textual adoption of the Hull Doctrine.7 5 The signatories to
both the TPP and the TTIP seek to protect investors from unlawful
expropriation,76 demonstrating that the Hull Doctrine has continued'
to be the preferred public policy stance of developed countries since the
formulation of the doctrine in the 1930's.
The underlying policy objectives of the TPP's and TTIP's
investment chapters-as well as the objectives of the Hull Doctrine-
derive from similar rationales: "first, to protect foreign investors from
political and other risks when they invest abroad; and, second, to
70. Leala Padmanabhan, TTIP The EU-US trade deal explained, BBC (Dec. 18,
2014), http//www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-30493297 [httpsJ/perma.cclFK76-D7ZA]
(archived Dec. 29, 2016).
71. Compare Trans Pacific Partnership Chapter 9, supra note 66, with
TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP, CHAPTER II - INVESTMENT,
COMISSION DRAFl' TEXT TTIP, at 5, http://trade.ec.europa.euldoclib/docs/2015/
september/tradoc_153807.pdf (last visited Dec. 29, 2016) [https://perma.ccl8X3R-K7B2]
(archived Dec. 29, 2016) [hereinafter Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership,
Chapter II].
72. Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, Chapter II, supra note 71,
at 5.
73. Id.
74. Compare Trans Pacific Partnership Chapter 9, supra note 66, at 9-9
(requiring "payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation") with
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, Chapter II, supra note 71, at 4 (also
requiring "payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation").
75. See infra Section III.A.
76. Trans-Pacific Partnership: Summary of U.S. Objectives, OFFICE OF THE U.S.
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/tpp/Summary-of-US-objectives (last visited
Dec. 29, 2016) [https://perma.ccRCE4-QH5Q] (archived Dec. 29, 2016).
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accelerate investment liberalization and market access."77 Critics
suggest that the expropriation provisions adopted in the TPP merely
reflect United States foreign investment policy and "[do] nothing to
promote sustainable investment, to combat corruption, or subject
investors to responsible behaviour."7 8 The TPP and the TTIP, however,
are forward looking in that their investment provisions ensure even
greater protections for foreign investors beyond that of the Hull
Doctrine.79 To ensure that full compensation will be fully awarded,
both the TPP and the TTIP contain two additional requirements
relating to compensation. First, the calculation for compensation is
detailed in the two treaties:
Such compensation shall amount to the fair market value of the investment at
the time immediately before the expropriation or the impending expropriation
became public knowledge, which is earlier, plus interest at a normal commercial
rate, from the date of expropriation until the date of payment. . . Such
compensation shall be effectively realisable, freely transferable in accordance
with Article 6 [Transfers] and made without delay.80
Second, the two treaties require disputes over expropriated
property be resolved through international arbitration, not by domestic
courts or administrative agencies within the expropriating country.8 1
Similar to the majority of BITs that are concluded on investment,
Chapter Nine of the TPP requires that "disputes between private
parties and governments over investment interests" be brought under
the Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 82 hereinafter referred to as
ICSID. The European Union under the TTIP hopes to establish a new
arbitration system, the Investment Court System (ICS), which would
77. Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, How the Investment Chapter of the Trans-
Pacific Partnership Falls Short, INTL INST. SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Nov. 6, 2015),
http://www.iisd.org/commentary/how-investment-chapter-trans-pacific-partnership-
falls-short [https://perma.cc/LCS5-ADDN] (archived Dec. 29, 2016).
78. Id.
79. Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, Chapter II, supra note 71,
at 5.
80. The text cited is found in the TTIP. Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership, Chapter II, supra note 71, at 5. The TPP's language is almost identical; the
most significant different is the TPP's use of the phrase "not reflect any change in value
occurring because the intended expropriation had become known earlier" rather than
the TTIP's version: "became public knowledge." See Trans Pacific Partnership Chapter
9, supra note 66, at 9-9.
81. See Trans Pacific Partnership Chapter 9, supra note 66, at 9-21;
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, Chapter II, supra note 71.
82. Stuart S. Malawer, Looking at Dispute Resolution in the Trans-Pacific
Partnership, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.newyorklawjournal.comlid=12027441
94514[Looking-at-Dispute-Resolution-in-the-TransPacific-Partnership?slreturn=
20160016212654 [https://perma.cc/3XG9-VD84] (archived Dec. 29, 2016).
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supplant ICSID.8 3 Settling these disputes through international
arbitration rather than domestic courts encourages foreign investment
because "[floreign investors strongly prefer international arbitration to
the host country's courts. One study revealed that, in their investment
decisions, investors tend to add a substantial legal risk premium 'to
reflect the contingent risk of subjection to a foreign court rather than
a neutral international forum."'8 International arbitration as a
mechanism for enforcing the TPP's and the TTIP's substantive laws is
thus critical for effecting an increase in foreign investment.
By implementing the Hull Doctrine and striving to form the ICS,
the European Commission recognizes that the TTIP incentivizes FDI
by increasing investment stability and "by making it easier for EU
companies to invest in the US, and for US companies to invest in the
EU." 85 These advantages arising from the TTIP enable "European
companies [to] expand globally and remain competitive
internationally."86 In contrast to investment laws adopted by countries
such as India, Indonesia, and Brazil, the signatories to the TPP and
the TTIP have incorporated a robust investment arbitration
mechanism. In a Brazil-Mozambique BIT, for instance, the two
countries criticized arbitration as too investor friendly and adopted to
use "conciliatory settlement of disputes" rather than a neutral
arbitrator.8 7
The status of Vietnam as a TPP signatory8 8 also demonstrates the
rising preeminence of the Hull Doctrine since the doctrine's fall from
customary international law. Since World War II, "[t]he most
widespread expropriations have occurred in the countries which
adopted communism."89 Vietnam was not an exception. In 1975, the
Vietnamese government expropriated American-owned property and
nationalized private businesses owned by South Vietnamese
individuals.9 0 However, in 1992, Vietnam changed its policy toward
83. Investment: Creating more investment opportunities in the EU and the US,
EUROPEAN COMMIlSSION, http://trade.ec.europa.euldoclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc-
153996.5%20Investment.pdf (last visited Dec. 29, 2016) [https://perma.cc/8HZY-8327]
(archived Dec. 29, 2016) [hereinafter Investment: Creating more investment opportunities
in the EU and the US].
84. Note: Protection of Foreign Direct Investment in a New World Order:
Vietnam-A Case Study, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1995, 2007 (1994) [hereinafter Vietnam Case
Study].
85. Investment: Creating more investment opportunities in the EU and the US,
supra note 83.
86. Id.
87. Sonia E. Rolland & David M. Trubek, Brazil's New Model Investment Treaty
May Challenge U.S. Approach on ISDS, 118 Daily Rep. Execs (BNA) B-1 (Jun. 19, 2015).
88. See Overview of TPP, supra note 57.
89. REPORT ON EXPROPRIATION OF AMERICAN-OWNED PROPERTY, supra note 7,
at 1066.
90. Thomas J. Lang, Satisfaction of Claims against Vietnam for Expropriation of
U.S. Citizens'Property in South Vietnam in 1975, 28 CORNELLINTLL. J. 265, 295 (1995).
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expropriation in the Hien Phap Constitution, arguably "adopting an
approach even more protective [for investors] than the Hull formula."91
Vietnam's continued support of the Hull Doctrine since the 1990's
demonstrates the increasing acceptance of the Hull Doctrine by a
communist country that had previously rejected the idea of full
compensation and pro-investor policies.92 Even though Vietnam is now
a proponent of the Hull Doctrine, more evidence of other nations'
acceptance is needed to ascertain whether this former norm has been
re-instated as customary international law during the last decade.
B. From Paquete Habana to Filartiga: Discerning Evidence of a
Customary International Law Norm
Customary international law is unwritten, binding international
law comprised of: "(1) a general and consistent practice of states and
(2) some sense of legal obligation to engage in that practice, otherwise
known as opinio juris."9 3 There is no established method for
determining whether a customary international law norm exists. U.S.
case law and customary international law scholars rely on different
types of evidence (be it treaties, UN resolutions, or domestic law, etc.)
to determine the global prevalence of a norm.94 This Note will first turn
to two U.S. Supreme Court cases; both offer guidance on which types
of international or legal documents may be used to demonstrate a
"general and consistent practice of states" and how that type of
evidence has changed over time.95
One of the seminal cases outlining the evidence used to establish
a customary international norm is the Paquete Habana. In the Paquete
Habana, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that capturing fishing
vessels as prizes of war violated customary international law.96 The
Supreme Court traced the history of this contested norm and relied on
the following evidence that the norm was binding customary
91. Vietnam Case Study, supra note 84.
92. Michael Scaturro, Vietnam Joins EU Initiative Pushing for Investor Court,
32 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2130 (Dec. 10, 2015) (claiming that Vietnam even supports the
ICS over concerns for investor protection).
93. THOMAS M. FRANK ET AL., U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw 98 (2012).
94. See id. at 124 ("Customary international law is widely considered to be more
difficult to ascertain than some of other forms of law, and the more controversial the
means for establishing that law, the more questions may be raised about its hierarchical
status.").
95. See id. at 98. For an alternative analysis of these two cases' incorporation of
CIL evidence see Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Understanding the Resemblance
Between Modern and Traditional Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L. L. 639,
643-44, 666-68 (2000).
96. See generally The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (holding that the
capture of two fishing vessels during a blockade around Cuba was unlawful).
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international law: English orders in Council of 1806 and 1810,
international law jurists, rulings in prize courts, "the opinions of
eminent statesmen," the domestic laws of foreign nations, treatises,
domestic courts of foreign nations, historical practice, military
commanders, and military manuals.97
Although the Paquete Habana Court relied on a variety of sources
to determine the existence of a customary international law norm, this
evidence was far from comprehensive. The Court almost exclusively
looked to European and U.S. jurists, treatises, war history, and
statements from government officials to reach its conclusion.98 The
only exceptions included the Court's reference to the Japanese
Empire's prize courts and the writings of an Argentine jurist, Carlos
Calvo.99 The Court, however, considered Japan a "civilized nation" and
therefore viewed the country's laws as evidence of customary
international law.100 The Paquete Habana Court's focus on civilized
nations suggests that at the dawn of the twentieth century only the
practices of "civilized nations" were relevant in U.S. jurisprudence as
evidence of customary international law. 101
A more contemporary perspective on the evidence used to
determine customary international law can be found in Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala.102 In Filartiga, the plaintiffs sued under the Alien Tort
Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, requiring the Second Circuit to determine
whether torture constitutes a violation of customary international
law.1 03 In holding that torture violates customary international law,
the Filartiga court examined the following evidence: General Assembly
Resolutions and Declarations, "the constitutions of over fifty-five
nations" that specifically ban torture, international agreements
including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights &
Fundamental Freedoms, the U.S. Department of State's memoranda
and amicus curiae, as well as "judicial opinions and the works of
jurists."1 04
97. Id. at 700-08.
98. See id. (citing French treatises, the United States war with Mexico, French
war conduct during the French Revolution, German books on international law, and
statesmen opinions of the Netherlands Ambassador to China, the captain of the Austrian
navy, Italian jurists, and Spanish Naval officers).
99. Id. at 700, 703-05.
100. Id. at 700.
101. See id. at 708 ("[B]y the general consent of the civilized nations of the world,
and independently of any express treaty or other public act, it is an established rule of
international law . .. that coast fishing vessels . . . are exempt from capture as prize of
war.").
102. Filartiga v. Pena-Irla, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
103. See id. at 889 ("Among the rights universally proclaimed by all nations, as
we have noted, is the right to be free from physical torture.").
104. Id. at 882-85.
[VOL. 50:499514
A PLURJLATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY
There are two critical issues that arise out of the Filartiga court's
interpretation of customary international law. First, the Filartiga
court considered the stances of foreign states, none of whom would
have been considered "civilized nations" for purposes of the Paquete
Habana's opinion.1 05 The more inclusive nature of the evidence used
by the Filartiga court, such as the references to Paraguay's
Constitution and the General Assembly declaration that was "adopted
without dissent," demonstrates that contemporary customary
international law relies on the consensus of all nations, not just
developed Western countries.106 Second, the Filartiga court stressed
the need to "interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it
has evolved and exists among the nations of the world today," 107 rather
than tracing the history as the Paquete Habana Court insisted.1 08
Legal scholars Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner explain that
the different sources used to identify customary international law in
the Paquete Habana and in Filartiga suggest that there are two
distinct approaches in customary international law. 109 Goldsmith and
Posner refer to these two approaches as (1) "traditional" customary
international law and (2) "modern" customary international law.110
The traditional customary international law approach, embodied in the
Paquete Habana decision, acknowledges that customary international
law exists "only if it influences the behavior of states in some
identifiable way.""' Identifying a norm using the traditional approach
is a difficult task because states choosing to act as a result of
coercion1 12 or a "coincidence of interest"1 3 should not inform the
existence of binding law.114 States that act in either such way do not
evidence "instances of international cooperation, and so labeling the
resulting behavior patterns 'norms of [customary international law]
105. Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
106. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 882-85.
107. Id. at 881.
108. Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700-08.
109. Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 95, at 640.
110. See generally id. (noting that "[elvery two hundred years, it seems, the
jurisprudence of customary international law ("CIL") changes" and that The Paquete
Habana represents the traditional CIL approach while Filartiga utilized modern CIL in
its analysis).
111. Id. at 651.
112. See id. at 657 ("Behavior regularities among nations might arise because a
powerful state (or coalition of powerful states) has forced a weaker state to engage in
actions that are contrary to the interests of the latter state.").
113. See id. at 655 ("A coincidence of interest is a behavioral regularity that occurs
when nations follow their immediate self-interest independent of any consideration of
the actions or interests of other nations.").
114. See id. at 654-55 (explaining that to properly establish a customary
international law, a state must act out a sense of legal obligation, not because it is
convenient or because a state has been coerced).
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CIL' is misleading even if it is tempting to characterize every case
where conflict is avoided as manifestation of international order."115
Goldsmith and Posner acknowledge that the modern customary
international law approach is different because this approach
emphasizes "looking to technically non-legal sources of law (such as
unratified treaties and U.N. General Assembly Resolutions) in
identifying CIL."11 6 Although many domestic and international courts
have adopted this approach in the years since Filartiga, there are
several conceptual issues that arise when using the modern approach
to identify a binding norm.11 7 First, the modern customary
international law approach "fails to [appropriately] reflect state
practice."11 8 For example, although the Second Circuit in Filartiga
found that customary international law bars torture, many states in
practice use torture to suit their needs despite openly repudiating the
act.119
Second, customary international law "is often unwritten, the
necessary scope and appropriate sources of 'state practice' are
unsettled, and the requirement that states follow customary norms
from a 'sense of legal obligation' is difficult to verify." 120 The unwritten
nature of customary law and the resulting difficulty in clearly
identifying a binding norm is especially problematic in the modern
approach, which relies heavily on treaties as evidence.121 Although
treaties can provide written, codified evidence of a norm,122 treaties
and customary international law are not entirely overlapping. For
instance, treaties are not binding on non-signatory parties and a
provision in a treaty may be a consequence of a quid-pro-quo
negotiation of which parties do not consider a binding norm.123
Moreover, "[c]ustomary law must be not only general, but also
practiced. No such practice requirement, however, applies to the
recognition of treaties."124 Therefore, it is probably most appropriate to
115. Id. at 658.
116. Id. at 667.
117. See id. at 667 ("Other national and international courts have in recent years
embraced a similar approach to CIL.").
118. Id.
119. See id. at 666 ('The [Filartiga] Court acknowledged that this holding was not
based on state practice, because many nations of the world torture their citizens.").
120. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARv. L. REV. 815, 855
(1997).
121. See Hiram E. Chodosh, An Interpretive Theory of International Law: The
Distinction Between Treaty and Customary Law, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 973, 1041
(1995) (explaining "a modern tendency ... to define customary law in terms of
treaty. .. ").
122. Id. at 1015, 1023.
123. See id. at 979.
124. Id. at 1027.
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view treaties as a source of customary international law that "alone
do[es] not make customary law."1 25
C. The Status of the Hull Doctrine in Twenty-First Century Customary
International Law
In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, the U.S. Supreme Court
acknowledged that "[t]here are few if any issues in international law
today on which opinion seems to be so divided as the limitations on a
state's power to expropriate the property of aliens."26 The Supreme
Court in recent years has provided no guidance on its views of the Hull
Doctrine's status as an international law canon. In determining
whether the Hull Doctrine has been reinstated as customary
international law since the conclusion of the TPP and the pending
conclusion of the TTIP, this Note will look to an array of evidence, all
of which has been vetted by the Paquete Habana and Filartiga
courts.127
Although the majority of legal analysts at the turn of the twenty-
first century agreed that the Hull Doctrine had not been followed by a
consensus of states out of a sense of legal obligation, there have been
significant developments since the norm fell out of global graces in
1973.128 At that time, "[eJighty-six governments supported a
resolution" that nullified the Hull Doctrine's standing as customary
international law.129 Recently, some scholars have pointed to "current
international practice as reflected in national investment laws,
bilateral investment treaties, multilateral conventions, and
international arbitral awards" to suggest that the Hull Doctrine's
"prompt, adequate, and effective" compensation requirement has
returned to prominence in international investment law.13 0
Perhaps the most convincing evidence that the Hull Doctrine has
been re-established as customary international law is the sheer
125. See id. at 1041 (relying on Article thirty-four of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, which states that a "treaty does not create either obligations or
rights for a third State without its consent") (internal citations omitted).
126. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
127. See supra Section III.B.
128. See Norton, supra note 11 at 475; supra Section II.A.
129. See Norton, supra note 11 at 474 ("Eighty-six governments supported a
resolution holding that a state expropriating foreign property 'is entitled to determine
the amount of possible compensation and the mode of payment .. . in accordance with
the national legislation of [that] State.") (alteration in original).
130. Vietnam Case Study, supra note 84, at 1996. See also ORGANISATION FOR
EcoNOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW: A CHANGING LANDSCAPE 44 n.1 (2005) ("Nowadays, the Hull formula and its
variations are often used and accepted and considered as part of customary international
law.").
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number of BITs that have required full compensation for investors of
expropriated property.13 1 As of 1991, a "survey of 335 of these treaties
[BITs] then in force found that they all required compensation to be
paid without undue delay (the 'prompt' component of the Hull formula)
and to be freely transferable (the 'effective' component)."'3 2 Developed
countries as well as developing countries have incorporated the Hull
Doctrine in BITs. For instance, BITs "between Argentina and El
Salvador, between Ethiopia and Sudan, and between the Russian
Federation and Turkey" have all integrated the Hull Doctrine's
favorable investment standard.'33 The inclusion of the Hull Doctrine
in the BITs by Argentina and El Salvador are particularly suggestive
of a trend toward adoption of the Hull Doctrine because it was precisely
these Latin American countries that resisted the Hull Doctrine in favor
of the Calvo Doctrine during the era of decolonization.134
The recent trend adopting the Hull doctrine can be explained by
two rationales. First, "the primary purpose of BITs is to promote
foreign investment" and the Hull Doctrine is more favorable to investor
interests than the Calvo Doctrine.'35 Second, "capital-exporting states
drove the movement to enter BITs, and they understandably sought to
have the language of these treaties be in terms most favorable to their
citizens."136
Nevertheless, not all BITs have included the exact formulation of
the Hull Doctrine. Both the Oman-Netherlands BIT (2009) and the
Chile-Tunisia BIT (1998) included a "just compensation" provision as
opposed to "payment of prompt, adequate, and effective
compensation."137 In the Oman-Netherlands BIT "rather than
requiring that compensation be based on an investment's value
immediately before the expropriation measures become public
knowledge, the [2009] BIT provides that the value 'shall represent the
real market value of the investments affected immediately before the
decision for the expropriation was taken or became publically
131. See Vietnam Case Study, supra note 84, at 1998.
132. Id. at 2000.
133. Shain Corey, But Is It Just? The Inability for Current Adjudicatory
Standards to Provide 'Just Compensation' for Creeping Expropriations, 81 FORDHAM L.
REV. 973, 991 (2013).
134. See id. (discussing the growing popularity of BITs); Daly, supra note 39, at
1150 (explaining the popularity of the Calvo doctrine in Latin America during
decolonization).
135. See Corey, supra note 133, at 991.
136. Id.
137. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Expropriation:
UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II,
UNCTAD/DIAE[IA/2011/7, 28 (2012) (quoting Article 4 of Oman-Netherlands BIT).
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known."'38 The China-Peru BIT requires "appropriate compensation,"
which an international arbitration panel later interpreted to mean that
"the amount needed should place the claimant in the same position he
or she would have been without the act of expropriation."13 9 Another
BIT between Uzbekistan and Bangladesh required "fair and equitable
compensation."1 40 This BIT stands in contrast with the Italy-
Bangladesh BIT, which incorporates the "prompt, adequate and
effective"141 wording and suggests that Italy, a developed Western
state, may have influenced the precise wording of this compensation
provision with Bangladesh.
These examples demonstrate that, while the majority of BITs
adhere to the Hull doctrine, several BITs have adopted different
standards such as just compensation, appropriate compensation, or
fair and equitable compensation.142 The World Bank Guidelines-often
cited as proof that the Hull Doctrine has successfully re-surfaced as
customary international lawl43-acknowledge that "[t]he point of
significant disagreement over the conditions of permissible
expropriations has concerned the measure of compensation for such
expropriations."44 In particular, the World Bank Guidelines assert
that although countries have incorporated different standards in BITs,
"[t]he two approaches [the Hull Doctrine and then the alternative.
approaches] are not, of course, mutually exclusive-for example,
compensation that is prompt, adequate and effective may also be the
most appropriate."I45 Thus, the World Bank Guidelines recognize a
distinction between the various compensation approaches employed by
BITs.
The World Bank Guidelines, however, too easily conflate the Hull
Doctrine and the alternative approaches. At the height of the Hull
138. Edward G. Kohoe & Paul B. Maslo, Trends in International Investment
Agreements, 2009/2010, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY
2010-2011, 50 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2012).
139. LEON E. TRAKMAN & NICOLA W. RANIERI, REGIONALISM IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 240 (2013).
140. Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh
and the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Reciprocal Protection and
Promotion of Investments, Bangl.-Uzb., art. 6.2, Feb. 14, 1998, http://investment
policyhub.unctad.orgfDownload/TreatyFile/279 [https://perma.cclH7LN-QYD5] (archived
Jan. 16, 2017).
141. August Reinish, How Narrow Are Narrow Dispute Settlement Clauses in
Investment Treaties?, 2 J. INT'L DISP. SETTLEMENT 115, 157 (2011).
142. See Vietnam Case Study, supra note 84, at 2000 (referring to the survey
completed during the 1990s discussed above).
143. See, e.g., id.
144. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT, WORLD
BANK GROUP 25 (1992), http://documents.worldbank.org/curatedlen/9552214687661677
66/pdf/multi-page.pdf [https://perma.cc/S62L-9Y9E] (archived Jan. 16, 2017).
145. Id.
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Doctrine's decline, "developing countries formally challenged the
United States' standard of prompt, adequate, and effective
compensation" in the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,
which advocated for the use of an "appropriate compensation"
approach.146 This interpretation of the "appropriate compensation"
during the 1970s demonstrates that the meaning of that standard was
intended to diverge from the Hull Doctrine.
Even BITs that do not explicitly incorporate the Hull Doctrine
calculate interest and allow for direct recourse by private foreign
investors to the international arbitration system.14 7 These changes
demonstrate that BITs during the 1990s and early twenty-first century
have undeniably moved toward a more investor-friendly compensation
approach. It remains, though, that not all BITs adopt the Hull
Doctrine.148
A large part of the TPP's and the TTIP's significance is the inter-
regional nature of these two treaties.149 During the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Uruguay Round, developed states
"attempt[ed] to negotiate a comprehensive agreement on investment,"
intending for such agreement to "provid[e] a comprehensive set of
investment-liberalization and investment-protection measures.150
Although the WTO member states concluded the Agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) as a companion multilateral
treaty to the WTO, the TRIMs' application is narrow and not commonly
invoked.'5 ' No other large scale multilateral investment treaties have
been concluded. The TPP and the TTIP thus suggest a departure from
the BIT-centric nature of investment law.152 The TPP in particular
demonstrates a more global trend in investment law because its
signatories include Asian, South Pacific, and North American
countries, all of which have agreed to the expropriation provisions of
the agreement.15 3 As an inter-regional investment agreement, the
146. Patricia M. Robin, Comment, The BIT Won't Bite: The American Bilateral
Investment Treaty Program, 33 AM. U.L. REV. 931, 952 (1984) (citing the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31)
U.N. Doc A19631 (1974)).
147. See generally Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II,
supra note 28.
148. See supra Section III. C; see, e.g., Series on Issues in International Investment
Agreements II, supra note 28, at 28.
149. See Overview of TPP, supra note 57.
150. Riyaz Dattu, Essay, A Journey From Havana to Paris: The Fifty-Year Quest for
the Elusive Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 275, 276 (2000).
151. See id. at 291 ("[T]he TRIMs Agreement has been widely criticized as being
'extremely limited in scope and .. . largely attuned to the concerns of an era in policy-
making characterized more by suspicion of -and the need to control- foreign
investment than by keenness to compete for and attract such investment.") (alteration
in original).
152. Overview of TPP, supra note 57
153. Id.
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TPP's impact offers powerful evidence of customary international law
and "[a] promising trend in the quest for further liberalization of
investment rules, [which] is found in the expansion of inter-regional
trade and investment agreements."154
The BITs', TPP's, and TTIP's impact on customary international
law may be reduced, however, because it is questionable whether
treaties are reliable indicators of customary international law. 155 Since
treaties are often negotiated on a quid-pro-quo basis, treaties may be
more indicative of coercion or concession than of customary law.156 In
contrast, some international legal scholars "view [treaties] as vehicles
that entrench customary principles of international law relating to the
protection of foreign investment."15 7 One scholar suggests that "where
bilateral investment treaties 'express a duty which customary law
imposes or is widely believed to impose, they give very strong support
to the existence of such a duty and preclude the contracting States from
denying its existence."'
15 8
In addition to BITs, international arbitral awards have
overwhelmingly favored investors by requiring states that have
expropriated property to pay "prompt, adequate, and effective
compensation."5 9 The adoption of the Hull doctrine in these arbitral
awards, however, is not demonstrative of a recent shift away from the
Calvo doctrine. Arbitral Awards even in the 1970s adhered to the Hull
doctrine's idea of full compensation.16 0 For instance, many arbitrations
of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal adopted the Hull Doctrine.161
The decision to award "prompt, adequate, and effective
compensation" in the Iran-U.S. Claim Tribunals, however, was by no
means unanimous.162 The dissent of several Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunals decided in favor of Iran by "cit[ing] the recent General
Assembly resolutions and favorable commentaries on them as evidence
of a new international standard," the Calvo Doctrine. 63 In an
arbitration on the expropriation of Libyan American Oil Company, the
panel rejected the application of the Hull Doctrine; the arbitrators
"held that, although 'the classical formula of [prompt], adequate and
effective compensation remain[s] as a maximum and a practical guide
154. Dattu, supra note 150, at 311.
155. See supra Section III.B.
156. See id.; see also Chodosh, supra note 121, at 979.
157. Bernard Kishoiyian, Note, The Utility of Bilateral Investment Treaties in the
Formulation of Customary International Law. 14 NW. J. INT'LL. & BUS. 327, 327 (1994).
158. Id. at 328
159. See Norton, supra note 11, at 502 (internal quotations omitted).
160. See id. at 477-78.
161. See id. at 483 ("All of the majority opinions have required the payment of full
compensation.") (emphasis in original).
162. Id. at 486.
163. Id.
2017/1 521
VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
for . . . assessment,' it was not the only compensation standard
applicable under international law."164 In valuing the arbitration
award, the panel applied an "appropriate compensation" standard,
which can be "construed to permit compensation of less than full
value."165 The Libyan American Oil Company award and the dissents
in the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunals demonstrate that some arbitrators
supported the Calvo Doctrine and alternative compensation
approaches such as "appropriate compensation" as valid substitutions
to the typically Western compensation approach, the Hull Doctrine.166
Although there have been inconsistencies in the computation for
compensating foreign investors,167 examples where arbitration panels
applied the Hull Doctrine are abundant. The commonality of the Hull
Doctrine can be ascribed to the growing popularity of BITs, the great
majority of which call on panels to award "prompt, adequate and
effective compensation."1 68 In perhaps the most high-profile
arbitration in the last decade, Yukos Oil Company ("Yukos") brought a
claim against the Russian Federation for unlawful expropriation.169
The Arbitration panel found that the Russian Federation indirectly
expropriated Yukos' assets and violated Article 13 of the Energy
Charter Treaty, which required states to provide "prompt, adequate
and effective compensation" upon expropriation of a foreign investor's
property.170 Applying the Hull Doctrine, the panel awarded $66.6
billion to the investors, which the panel reduced by 25 percent to $50
billion for contributory negligence.1 7 '
Even in Alpha Projektholding GMBH v. Ukraine ("Alpha"), where
a tribunal did not explicitly adopt the Hull formula, the tribunal
awarded "payment of adequate compensation."172 The panel, however,
164. Id. at 481 (alterations in original).
165. Id. at 488.
166. Id. at 486, 488.
167. See generally Joshua B. Simmons, Valuation in Investor-State Arbitration:
Toward a More Exact Science, 30 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 196, 208-13 (2012) (claiming that
although arbitrators adopt the common "prompt, adequate and effective" compensation
standard, in more than half the arbitral awards studied in expropriation cases, tribunals
"split the baby" by awarding less than the full amount of compensation claimed by
successful claimants).
168. See Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them:
Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 666-
68 (explaining that developing countries that had previously rejected the Hull
formulation are now signing BITS that "require prompt, adequate and effective
compensation").
169. MEETING OF THE ENERGY CHARTER INDUSTRY ADVISORY PANEL (IAP) 2
(2015), http://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/IAP/20150721/IP20




172. Alpha Projektholding GMBH v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/16, Award,
1 404 (Nov. 8, 2010), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
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did not interpret "adequate compensation" as the panel did in the
Libyan American Oil Company arbitration.173 In the Alpha arbitration,
the tribunal held that "the amount of compensation must put Claimant
in the situation, in which it would have been if Respondent had not
breached the UABIT," 74 exhibiting a policy favorable toward investors
that in practice mirrors the application of the Hull Doctrine. This trend
shows that developing countries recognize the benefits of policies, such
as the Hull Doctrine, that encourage foreign investment. Moreover, one
may posit that countries that had previously rejected the Hull Doctrine
are now finding favor with it because "[fJoreign investments in these
countries no longer involve pre-existing long-term concessions ceded on
unfavorable terms to former colonial authorities, but rather new
investments invited on freely negotiated terms." 175 Because
developing countries are no longer subject to such colonial pressures,
"these countries lack their previous justification for expropriating the
new foreign investments with only partial compensation."176
Even though many developing countries since the 1990s have
submitted to investment arbitration, some have expressed disdain for
this investment dispute system.'7 7 For instance, countries including
Bolivia, Venezuela, and Ecuador have either limited ICSID's
jurisdiction in investment matters or have rejected the ICSID
arbitration system outright.78 The former Attorney General and
current Chief Justice of Singapore, Sundaresh Menon, expressed
aversion to investment arbitration when, in 2012, he exclaimed:
"ruling[s] in favor of investors from traditionally capital-exporting
countries [are] the 'price' that has to be paid to gain credibility and
access to the privileged club of elite international arbitrators."17 9 Not
only is Menon's commentary indicative of developing countries' views
that the Hull doctrine is not obligatory under international law, but it
also supports the criticism previously discussed regarding the use of
treaties as evidence of customary law. 80 Menon implies that Singapore
subjects itself to pro-investor awards in investment arbitrations as a
compromise to gain access to the benefits of economic relations with
developed countries that insist on using ICSID and the Hull Doctrine
to protect foreign investment.'8
ita0026.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3W8-SEK5] (archived Jan. 14, 2017) [hereinafter Alpha].
173. See supra Section III.C.
174. See Alpha, supra note 172, at ¶ 436.
175. Vietnam Case Study, supra note 84, at 1998.
176. Id.
177. Brower & Blanchard, supra note 54, at 692.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See supra Section III.B.
181. Brower & Blanchard, supra note 54, at 692; see also supra Section II.B.
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Certainly the evidence provided by the thousands of BITs, the
TPP, the TTIP, investor-state arbitral awards, and the practice of
nation-states demonstrates, at the very least, a trend toward
implementing the Hull Doctrine and safeguarding the rights of
investors. In fact, this evidence suggests that, as of 2016, there may be
a consensus of states (the first requirement in establishing customary
international law) that have incorporated the Hull Doctrine into their
investment law policies.'8 2 However, the statements made by officials
of developing states as well as the quid-pro-quo nature of treaty
negotiations in BITs, the TPP, and the TTIP indicate that developing
states do not feel obligated to provide "payment of prompt, adequate
and effective compensation."18 3 This Note thus posits that the second
requirement necessary to establish a customary international law,
opinio juris, has not yet been met.
IV. SOLUTION
The TPP and the TTIP, as large inter-regional treaties,184 have
initiated a new era in international investment law, resulting in
developing countries' continued incorporation of the Hull Doctrine.85
Still, a lack of opinio juris among developing countries has impeded the
Hull Doctrine's re-emergence as a customary international norm.18 6
This Note proposes that adopting a new plurilateral treaty, as opposed
to a multilateral treaty, under the framework of the WTO would likely
result in the Hull Doctrine's acceptance in twenty-first century
customary international law. Before delving into the substantive
analysis of this proposal, this Note will first address the difference
between WTO multilateral and plurilateral treaties.
A. How the Adoption of a Comprehensive Plurilateral Treaty on
Investment within the WTO Would Establish Customary International
Law
The conclusion of the Uruguay Round of Trade in 1995 culminated
in the Marrakesh Agreement, the constitutive document of the
WTO. 8 7 The substantive and procedural rules governing the WTO
182. See supra Section III.B.
183. See SALACUSE, supra note 22, at 68.
184. Overview of the TPP, supra note 57.
185. See e.g., Vietnam Case Study, supra note 84, at 2005 (describing Vietnam's
changing position on investment law).
186. See Brower & Blanchard, supra note 54, at 692 (highlighting government
officials from developing countries and their public statements rejecting pro-investment
policies); supra Section III.C.
187. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994 1867 U.N.T.S. 154.
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consist of the Marrakesh agreement and four annexes.1 88 Those four
annexes consist of both multilateral and plurilateral treaties.1 89
Multilateral agreements include the WTO's primary substantive rules
and are binding upon all WTO member states.19 0 Plurilateral treaties,
instead, cover limited, specific topics, and WTO member states have no
obligation to become parties to these treaties.191 Both plurilateral and
multilateral treaties consist of multiple signatory parties.19 2 Although
four plurilateral agreements were established after the Uruguay
Round, only two plurilateral agreements-trade in civil aircraft and
government procurement-remain effective.'9 3
1. The WTO as a Promising Venue for Concluding the Next Global
Investment Treaty
One legal scholar, Kevin Kennedy, has claimed that "a strong
argument can be made that the WTO is the proper forum for
concluding a multilateral investment agreement."194 Since the
formation of the WTO in 1995, 164 states have become members.'9 5
Many of the WTO's members are states that have been skeptical of the
Hull Doctrine; 96 these states include Bangladesh, Ukraine, and
Venezuela, among others.9 7 If a WTO agreement were to include a
provision requiring "prompt, adequate, and effective compensation,"
the number of developing countries in the WTO that had previously
been proponents of the Calvo doctrine could become members of this
188. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO), UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 23 (2015),
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif_e/utwchap2_e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BL5W-CMEG] (archived Jan. 14, 2017).
189. Id. at 34, 36, 51.
190. WTO, THE WTO MULTILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 3 (2014),
https://ecampus.wto.org/admin/files/Course_622/CourseContents/MTA-E-R3-Print.pdf
[https://perma.cc[L964-TJPH] (archived Jan. 14, 2017).
191. Plurilaterals: of minority interest, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/
thewto-e/whatis_e/tif e/agrmlOe.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2017) [https://perma.cc/
TA4K-MFMV] (archived Jan. 14, 2017) [hereinafter Plurilaterals: of minority interest].
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Kevin C. Kennedy, A WTO Agreement on Investment: A Solution In Search
of A Problem?, 24 U. PA. J. INT'L EcoN. L. 77, 180 (2003).
195. Understanding the WTO - Members, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/
thewto-e/whatis_etif e/org6_e.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2017) [https://perma.cc/EY7D-
JBJK] (archived Jan. 14, 2017) [hereinafter WTO Members]; see also Kennedy, supra
note 194, at 179 (recognizing the "broad-based membership" of WTO member states).
196. See supra Section III.C.
197. See WTO Members, supra note 195 (listing the 164 WTO member states and
observer governments).
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new agreement, thus furthering the Hull Doctrine's acceptance under
international law.198
Concluding an investment treaty within the WTO's existing
framework is sensible "because of the close link between trade and
liberalized investment rules."19 9 The WTO's structure would naturally
facilitate a future negotiation on a trade and investment treaty because
the WTO already has in place the Working Group on Trade and
Investment.200 In this working group, representatives from member
states have "conduct[ed] analytical work on the relationship between
trade and investment" since 1996.201 Here, a negotiation could spark
interest in an investment agreement with global implications.
Continuing such discussion during a WTO trade round would also
naturally advance negotiations on an investment agreement.202
Although the current trade round, the Doha Round (2001-present), has
not made investment law a priority, the mere ability to discuss trade
and investment terms in a trade round likely increases the feasibility
of concluding such a deal.203
The WTO's dispute settlement system offers yet another favorable
benefit for effectively adjudicating investment law disputes.204 The
WTO's dispute settlement body (DSB) is arguably the most successful
judicial organ in international law. Member states have initiated 518
disputes within the DSB as of January 2017,205 demonstrating the
DSB's legitimacy among member states in comparison with other
198. See Plurilaterals: of minority interest, supra note 191 (becoming a member of
a plurilateral agreement is voluntary); supra Section III.C.
199. Kennedy, supra note 194, at 180.
200. Trade and Investment, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/invest
e/investe.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2017) [https://perma.cc/9B5D-R8BR] (archived Jan.
14, 2017).
201. Id.
202. See The Uruguay Round, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/
whatis e/tif e/fact5e.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2017) [https://perma.cc/23ED-BXA6]
(archived Jan. 14, 2017) (detailing the negotiations that occur during trade rounds, such
as the Uruguay Round).
203. WTO, AID FOR TRADE AT A GLANCE 2015 258 (2015),
https://www.wto.org/english/res-elbooksp-e/a4tl1_2_chap-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/
S3WB-KWML] (archived Jan. 14, 2017) ("[A]greement and implementation of the Doha
Round ... and, eventually, an agreement on investment, would provide multilateral or
plurilateral support for high-quality trade facilitation.").
204. See Introduction to the WTO dispute settlement system, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispuwe/disp-settlement-cbt-e/c1s5pl-e.htm (last
visited Jan. 14, 2017) [https://perma.cc/P66P-SATE] (archived Jan. 14, 2017) ("[T]he
applicability of the DSU to those Plurilateral Trade Agreement is subject to the adoption
of a decision by the parties to each of these agreements setting out the terms for the
application of the DSU to the individual agreement. . . .").
205. Current status of disputes, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/
dispu-e/dispu.current-statuse.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2017) [https://perma.cc/6UZU-
S66E] (archived Jan. 14, 2017).
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international institutions.206 The current international arbitration
system to which the majority of BITs adhere, the ICSID, receives
frequent criticism because its arbitration panels have not been
consistent in the valuation of compensation when applying the Hull
Doctrine.207 This Note posits that bringing investment disputes under
the DSB may lead to a more uniform application of the Hull Doctrine.
Even though the WTO's DSB has not adopted a formal system of
precedent, the WTO's system incorporates quasi-precedent and
appellate review.208 These features of the DSB would likely lead to
more consistent results than the ICSID, where arbitral panels
frequently use different valuation techniques for calculating
damages.2 0 9
Even though the WTO's dispute settlement system may positively
contribute to a more consistent application of the Hull Doctrine, the
DSB as it currently operates is perhaps the largest stumbling block to
feasibly concluding an investment treaty. The WTO's DSB allows only
states to seek recourse against other sovereign states.2 10 If a
comprehensive investment agreement were to be concluded, the
current standing conditions in the DSB would bar investors from
seeking relief against states for unlawful expropriation.21 1 There are
two possible alternatives to this predicament. First, member states of
such an investment agreement could negotiate an exception, allowing
206. See David Davenport, International Criminal Court: 12 Years, $1 Billion, 2
Convictions, FORBES (Mar. 12, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/daviddavenport/2014/
03/12/international-criminal-court- 12-years-1-billion-2-convictions-2/#2715e4857a0b40
186ff36440 [https://perma.cclRAR3-G2S5] (archived Jan. 14, 2017) (pointing to the ICC's
limited legitimacy where there has only been two successful convictions in twelve years).
207. See Simmons, supra note 167, at 200, 208 (explaining that some panels have
calculated interest differently, while other panels have used different valuation methods
such as discounted flow analysis or "splitting the baby," leading to inconsistencies in the
application of the "payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation" standard).
208. Legal effect of panel and appellate body reports and DSB recommendations
and rulings, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/disp-settlement_
cbt_e/c7s2pl-e.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2017) [https://perma.cc/47GT-X6K8] (archived
Jan. 14, 2017) [hereinafter Legal effect of panel and appellate body reports] ("Although
unadopted panel reports have no formal legal status in the GATT or WTO system, the
reasoning contained in an unadopted panel report can nevertheless provide useful
guidance to a panel or the Appellate Body in a subsequent case involving the same legal
question.").
209. See Simmons, supra note 167, at 200; Legal effect of panel and appellate body
reports, supra note 208; see also Rafael Leal-Arcas, The Multilaterization ofInternational
Investment Law, 35 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 33 (2009) (The Hull "formula has not
been applied literally [by ICSID panels]: 'Prompt' has not excluded payments over time,
and 'adequate' has often not been the equivalent of full value").
210. Todd S. Shenkin, Note, Trade-Related Investment Measures in Bilateral
Investment Treaties and the GATT: Moving Toward a Multilateral Investment Treaty, 55
U. PrIT. L. REV. 541, 544 (1994).
211. Id.
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recourse for private individuals to the DSB only in unlawful
expropriation claims against a foreign government.212 This solution,
however, is problematic because it undermines the political aspect of
the WTO that centers on negotiation among sovereign states, often
behind closed doors.213 A second alternative solution would allow
states to take up their own nationals' cases and seek remedies for those
nationals who have been harmed by unlawful expropriations of other
nation-states.214 This solution would likely be detrimental to investors
and the public. Investors would probably encounter difficulties in
collecting compensation from their own government. and the
government would have to expend its own money in advocating
investor claims.215 Negotiations on such an issue could have the
consequence of derailing an investment agreement within the WTO.
The trade negotiations themselves are yet another impediment to
the conclusion of a new investment treaty because the successful
conclusion of such an agreement is likely dependent on the Doha Trade
Round. The Doha Round, which began in 2001, has been deemed a
failure by many legal scholars.2 16 It is unclear when a new trade round
will begin. The year 2016 became "the first time in a decade and a half,
[in which] the World Trade Organization (WTO) [began] its year in
Geneva without a consensus mandate to complete the 2001 Doha
Round."217 Because negotiating and concluding a comprehensive
investment agreement under the directive of the WTO would need the
support of its members, this Note recommends that a new round of
trade negotiations be initiated to address investment policies.
Despite the aforementioned obstacles to concluding an agreement,
unifying investment and trade policies in a single international
212. Id. at 544-45 (promoting the "eventual inclusion of private rights within the
GATT's trade dispute settlement system").
213. JOHN W. HEAD, LOSING THE GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT WAR 87 (2008)
(criticizing the WTO because it "is a closed, non-transparent organization that operates
in secret...").
214. Suggesting an alteration to the character of DSB disputes is not
unprecedented. See generally SAIF AL-ISLAM ALQADHAFI, REFORMING THE WTO: TOWARD
MORE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND DECISION-MAKING 2 (2007), https://www.wto.org/
englishlforums e/ngo-e/posp67_gaddafi-found-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/AG2D-FHFP]
(archived Jan. 14, 2017) (offering "a radical solution involving more direct involvement
of civil society and the private sector in WTO governing structures").
215. Radl Torres, Use of the WTO Trade Dispute Settlement Mechanism by the
Latin American Countries - Dispeling Myths and Breaking Down Barriers 9 (WTO Staff
Working Paper ERSD-2013-03, 2012), https://www.wto.org/english/res-e/reser e/
ersd201203_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ZAR-4HC3] (archived Jan. 14, 2017) ("[Ilnitiating a
WTO dispute is a costly exercise in terms of both time and money.").
216. See, e.g., Andrew Charlton, The collapse of the Doha trade round,
CENTREPIECE (Autumn 2006), http://cep.1se.ac.uk/pubs/download/CP210.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GE2N-9LSY] (archived Jan. 14, 2017).
217. Bryce Baschuk, WTO Begins to Ponder a Future Beyond Doha, 33 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 55 (Jan. 14, 2016).
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framework is not a revolutionary idea. WTO member states are already
obligated to adhere to TRIMs. 218 The TRIMs Agreement, however, is
extremely limited in scope and does not include any provisions
connected to expropriation of foreign investment.219 TRIMs primarily
restricts the avenues that a state could employ in regulating the free-
movement of goods.220 Because TRIMs is limited to regulations
affecting trade in goods, "only 6% of all overseas affiliates of U.S.
companies are affected by TRIMS." 221 This statistic demonstrates the
limited effects that TRIMs has on international investment. In
addition, the TRIMs Agreement has been narrowly applied and does
not "creat[e] a framework for the regulation of all aspects of FDI." 222
An international investment agreement that includes many of the
common BIT provisions safeguarding FDI would thus expand the scope
of the WTO's involvement with investment issues.223
2. Concluding a Plurilateral Agreement: On the Road to a Customary
International Norm
Although this Note agrees with Kennedy's assertion that the WTO
is a favorable setting for concluding an investment agreement with
global implications, 224 this Note finds that a plurilateral agreement-
rather than a multilateral agreement-would be more successful in
establishing the Hull Doctrine's status as customary international law.
There are three primary reasons to support the argument that a
plurilateral investment agreement is a more appropriate mode of
garnering support for customary international law than a multilateral
investment agreement.
First, only WTO member states that voluntarily become parties to
a plurilateral agreement are bound by its terms.2 25 The voluntary
nature of plurilateral agreementS226 arguably offers a strong indication
that the signatories endorse the provisions of the agreements and feel
legally obligated to act accordingly. This Note asserts that the adoption
218. See generally Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures arts. 1-9,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 186 [hereinafter TRIMs Agreement].
219. See id.
220. See Kennedy, supra note 194, at 139 (describing the limited nature of TRIMs
and calling for a multilateral investment agreement).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 101.
223. See id.
224. See generally id. (arguing that trade and investment are inter-related and
that the WTO is a proper venue to concluding an agreement containing both trade and
investment issues).
225. Plurilaterals: of minority interest, supra note 191.
226. See id.
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of a plurilateral agreement by a number of WTO member states of their
own volition would be highly indicative that the Hull Doctrine has been
reinstated as customary international law.2 2 7
Second, the apparent failure of the Doha Round may offer a
promising opportunity to begin negotiations on investment issues since
"WTO members are expected to begin a series of discussions-both
inside and outside the WTO's negotiating umbrella-to determine
which issues they may be able to advance on a plurilateral level."228
Because trade negotiations during the Doha Round have subsided,
many WTO experts have suggested that plurilateral agreements may
yield more liberalizing trade results.229 As a result, member states
have turned to new issues to be negotiated as WTO agreements.230
This openness to negotiating plurilateral agreements may offer the
greatest opportunity to establish new investment law norms.
Third, plurilateral agreements are usually conceived from
negotiations by a small number of WTO member states, each with the
goal of devising a new set of trade policy norms.231 Thus, there is no
need to garner the support of all 164 WTO members to conclude a
plurilateral agreement.232 Plurilateralism is also beneficial because it
has the additional effect of liberalizing trade gradually, one of the
WTO's most important policy goals.233
B. Pro-Investor or Pro-Western: Is the Hull Doctrine the Right
Solution for Developing Countries?
Western developed countries have favored the inclusion of
"prompt, adequate, and effective compensation" provisions in
investment treaties since Secretary Hull's articulation of the doctrine
227. If this were to occur, opinio juris would likely be present among a consensus
of states. See FRANK ET AL., supra note 93, at 98.
228. Baschuk, supra note 217.
229. Corina Berceanu, Why has the unsuccessful Doha round resulted in bilateral
and inter-regional FTAs and what are the consequences for global trade?, GEOPOLITICS,
http://english.geopolitics.ro/why-has-the-unsuccessful-doha-round-resulted-in-bilateral-
and-inter-regional-ftas-and-what-are-the-consequences-for-global-trade/ (ast visited
Jan. 14, 2017) [https://perma.cc/9AH9-RVGY] (archived Jan. 14, 2017).
230. Pedro da Motta Veiga & Sandra Polnia Rios, Should the WTO Deal with
Private Sector Initiatives, in THE FUTURE AND THE WTO: CONFRONTING THE
CHALLENGES 147 (Ricardo Mel6ndez-Ortiz et al. eds., 2012) (discussing Brazil's
objectives to bring investment rules under the umbrella of the WTO).
231. WTO, Plurilateralism Against Multilateralism? A Multi-Stakeholder
Perspective (2012) (unpublished presentation), https://www.wto.org/english/forums-e/
public foruml2_e/session29agahe.pdf (last visited Jan. 16, 2017) [https://perma.cc/
L3W7-E9GMI (archived Jan. 16, 2017).
232. See id.
233. See id.; see also MARC BACCHETTA & MARION JANSEN, WTO, ADJUSTING TO
TRADE LIBERALIZATION 7 (2003), https://www.wto.org/english/res-elbooksp-e/
special study_7_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5H8-HRNA] (archived Jan. 16, 2017).
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during the 1930s.234 Developed countries' positions on this issue may
be economically justified because rules favoring investors increase
foreign direct investment and have the effect of encouraging capital
formation.235 Whether pro-investor provisions like the Hull Doctrine
benefit developing countries, though, is important in determining
whether developing countries will have the incentive to support the
Hull Doctrine as customary international law.
Several studies indicate that developing countries with emerging
economies and functional education systems have economically
benefited from the influx of FDI. 236 However, "[s]ome of the poorest
regions continue[] to see declines in FDI flows." 237 For example, Sub-
Saharan Africa has received less than 3 percent of FDI, and the little
FDI they have received does not have the same positive effects on
"infrastructure development" and return on capital as in other
developing countries.238
Nevertheless, the economic benefits for many developing
countries, particularly those in Asia, cannot be ignored.239 Proponents
of FDI cite a laundry list of benefits for developing countries. For
instance, the IMF explains that FDI "is different from other major
types of external private capital in that it is motivated largely by the
investors' long-term prospects for making profits in production
activities that they directly control."240 Given that investors providing
FDI are most concerned about long-term gains, "[n]ot only can FDI add
to investible resources and capital formation, but, perhaps more
important, it is also a means of transferring production technology,
skills, innovative capacity, and organizational and managerial
practices between locations, as well as of accessing international
marketing networks."241 Other benefits include technology and
"knowledge transfers."24 2
234. See supra Section II.A.
235. See Padma Mallampally & Karl P. Sauvant, Foreign Direct Investment in
Developing Countries, INTL MONETARY FUND (IMF (1999), httpJ/www.imf.org/external/
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237. UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2011 (2011), http://unctad.org/en/
PublicationsLibrary/wir201l en.pdf [httpsl/perma.ccBZX8-68EM] (archived Mar. 5, 2017).
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241. Id.
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FDI, as opposed to other types of investment vehicles, has also
benefited markets during economic downturns.243 During the 1997-98
financial downturn, FDI inflows remained steady in East Asia.244
During that same recession, "other forms of private capital flows-
portfolio equity and debt flows, and particularly short-term flows-
were subject to large reversals during the same period ... ."245 Not only
has FDI stabilized investment for developing countries in Asia, but it
has also been shown to increase domestic investment.246
Not all FDI has advanced the economies of developing states. For
instance, some investors see FDI as a method for gaining control and
leverage in a country, and others have conducted fire sales of their
investments.247 Critics have pointed to the large number of BITs
negotiated between developed and developing countries. In such BITs,
"the benefits that developing countries can obtain in North-South
bilateral negotiations are circumscribed by their usually weaker
bargaining power and the limited negotiating flexibility of their
developed-country partner."248
Despite FDI's negative consequences, "[a]t present, the consensus
view seems to be that there is a positive association between FDI
inflows and growth provided receiving countries have reached a
minimum level of educational, technological and/or infrastructure
development."24 9 Assuming these economic justifications for FDI are
true, developing countries would benefit from adopting international
obligations that are investor-friendly. These obligations, of course,
include the Hull Doctrine.
V. CONCLUSION
International investment norms collapsed during the era of
decolonization, an era that vehemently rejected Western values and
promoted the sovereign rights of developing countries.25 0 The world in
2017, though, has drastically changed since the era of decolonization.
Developing countries' rationales for rejecting international investment
norms have since become less persuasive. In the modern globalized
world, investors seek protection when contributing capital to
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corporations in foreign countries.251 For developing countries, these
investments can provide capital to lift individuals out of poverty and
improve the overall economic condition of the country.252 This Note
emphasizes that, as a normative goal, re-establishing the Hull
Doctrine as a customary international law norm would likely be
beneficial to developing countries and would have positive economic
effects on their economies.
Although fraught with political obstacles, this Note argues that
the most promising method for reintroducing the Hull Doctrine as
customary international law involves the conclusion of a plurilateral
investment agreement. Even though most WTO members would have
to become parties to such a plurilateral agreement in order to achieve
this goal, the voluntary membership of plurilateral agreements253
among other considerations is strongly indicative of opinio juris. As of
yet, this solution is far from implementation, but if achieved, may offer
the best evidence of a global trend favoring the Hull Doctrine.
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